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SALIENCY, ANCHORS & FRAMES:  
A MULTICOMPONENT DAMAGES 
EXPERIMENT 
Bernard Chao and Roderick O’Dorisio 
Modern technology products contain thousands, sometimes hundreds 
of thousands, of different features. Nonetheless, when electronics 
manufacturers are sued for patent infringement, these suits typically 
accuse only one feature, or in more complex suits, a handful of 
features, of actual patent infringement. But damages verdicts often do 
not reflect the relatively small contribution an individual patent makes 
to an infringing product. One study observed that verdicts in these 
types of cases average 9.98% of the price of the entire product. While 
both courts and commentators have blamed the law of patent damages, 
the role cognitive biases play in these outsized damages awards has 
been understudied. Relying on decision-making concepts from other 
contexts, we hypothesize that two biases, namely, a saliency bias and 
anchoring, may be at work in a patent trial. Since the infringing 
feature is the most salient feature in a patent trial (i.e. the focus of the 
trial), jurors may tend to overvalue that feature. Moreover, a 
patentee’s irrationally high damages demand may “anchor” the juries 
to that number. 
We conducted an online 3x3x2 between-subjects experiment to test 
whether these biases exist and if so, whether particular debiasing 
techniques may reduce these biases. In eighteen different scenarios, 
mock jurors were asked to assess damages for different smartphone 
features. The three manipulations involved: 1) rotating three features 
so that they were either the feature underlying the plaintiffs’ claim (the 
“feature-in-suit”) or one of the other features defendant identified as 
contributing to the smartphone’s overall value; 2) changing the jury 
verdict form so that mock jurors had to evaluate both the feature-in-
suit and other features together; and 3) having the defendant explicitly 
call out the plaintiff for anchoring the jury in an irrationally high 
number. 
The results suggest that some combination of the saliency bias and 
anchoring were at play when juries assessed damages for all three 
tested features. However, for the storage feature the results were only 
signficant for the feature’s relative rank, but not its dollar valuation. 
That may be because mock juors are familir with the cost of the 
increased storage. Modifying the jury verdict form reduced, but did not 
eliminate, the primary effect of the saliency bias, while the defendant’s 
tactic of exposing the plaintiffs’ anchor did not significantly reduce 
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damages. In addition, qualitative comments suggested that some mock 
jurors resisted the jury instructions designed to compensate plaintiffs 
for the missing feature and instead assessed damages to punish the 
defendant. 
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Introduction 
Modern technology products contain thousands, sometimes hundreds of 
thousands, of different features. Nonetheless, when electronics manufactur-
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ers are sued for patent infringement, these suits typically accuse only one 
feature, or in more complex suits, a handful of features, of actual patent in-
fringement. But damages verdicts often do not reflect the relatively small 
contribution an individual patent makes to an infringing product. One study 
observed that verdicts in these types of cases average 9.98% of the price of 
the entire product. While both the courts and commentators have blamed the 
law of patent damages, the role cognitive biases may play in these outsized 
damages awards has been understudied. Relying on decision-making con-
cepts from other contexts, we hypothesize that two biases, namely, a salien-
cy bias and anchoring, may be at work in a patent trial. Since the infringing 
feature is the most salient feature in a patent trial (i.e. the focus of the trial), 
jurors may tend to overvalue that feature. Moreover, a patentee’s irrationally 
high damages demand may “anchor” the juries to that number. 
We conducted an online 3x3x2 between-subjects experiment to test 
whether these biases exist and if so, whether particular debiasing techniques 
may reduce these biases. In eighteen different scenarios, mock jurors were 
asked to assess damages for different smartphone features. The three ma-
nipulations involved: 1) rotating three features so that they were either the 
feature-in-suit underlying the plaintiffs’ claim or one of the other features 
the defendant identified as contributing to the smartphone’s overall value; 2) 
changing the jury verdict form so that mock jurors had to evaluate both the 
feature-in-suit and other features together; and 3) having the defendant ex-
plicitly call out the plaintiff for anchoring the jury in an irrationally high 
number. 
The results suggest that some combination of the saliency bias and an-
choring were at play when juries assessed damages for all three tested fea-
tures. However, for the storage feature the results were only significant for 
the feature’s relative rank, not its dollar valuation.  That may be because the 
value of increased storage was familiar to mock jurors while the value of the 
other two features was not. Modifying the jury verdict form reduced, but did 
not eliminate, the primary effect of the saliency bias, while the defendant’s 
tactic of exposing the plaintiffs’ anchor did not significantly reduce damag-
es. In addition, qualitative comments suggested that some mock jurors re-
sisted the jury instructions designed to compensate plaintiffs for the missing 
feature and instead assessed damages to punish the defendant. 
This article proceeds in six parts. Part I discusses the problem of large 
damages in multicomponent patent lawsuits. It explains how commentators 
have characterized the problem and how courts have sought to address the 
issue. In both cases, these experts have focused on legal fixes that do not 
take into account cognitive biases. By taking concepts from various deci-
sion-making studies, Part II describes the saliency bias and anchoring gen-
erally and then explains how they may operate in patent trials to inflate 
damages awards. Part II then explores two potential de-biasing techniques. 
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Part III describes the experiment, which was based on a product misla-
beling lawsuit. The defendant mistakenly advertised a single feature that 
was not present in the smartphone that the plaintiffs purchased. Liability 
was conceded, and mock jurors only had to decide damages. Although our 
primary goal was to evaluate how juries determine patent damages, we 
based our experiment on a products misrepresentation case. The simpler le-
gal requirements in a misrepresentation claim allowed us to rotate different 
smartphone features between the plaintiffs’ case and the defendant’s case 
more easily. The plaintiff would describe the feature-in-suit and request a 
high damages award. In response, the defendant would minimize the value 
of the feature-in-suit and would describe several other smartphone features 
to show that the feature-in-suit only contributed to a small part of the overall 
value of the smartphone. After mock jurors assessed damages, they were 
asked to also value the other features that the defendant described. By com-
paring the value of a feature when it was in the plaintiffs’ case with the val-
ue of the same feature when it was in the defendant’s case, we were able to 
determine whether saliency and anchoring were operating to increase dam-
age awards. In our second manipulation, we changed the jury verdict form 
to require mock jurors to assess the value of the feature-in-suit together with 
other features to determine whether we can take advantage of other heuris-
tics (in this case, a framing effect) to reduce the primary effect of the salien-
cy bias (if any). Finally, in our third manipulation, we tested another debi-
asing technique. This time the defendant explicitly accuses the plaintiff of 
asking for irrationally high damages to take advantage of anchoring effects. 
The theory is that if the mock jurors understand that they may be manipulat-
ed, they will be less susceptible to that manipulation. 
Part IV then describes our results. Our primary saliency-bias hypothesis 
was confirmed for two tested features (camera resolution and enhanced se-
curity). The values of these features were significantly more valuable when 
they were part of the plaintiffs’ case than when they were part of the de-
fendant’s case. However, the findings with respect to a third feature (more 
storage) were more difficult to interpret. Mock jurors ranked the value of 
this feature higher when it was part of the plaintiffs’ lawsuit, but their mone-
tary valuation did not increase as well. That may be because the value of in-
creased storage was familiar to mock jurors while the value of the other two 
features was not. Additionally, we had mixed results for our debiasing ma-
nipulations. Modifying the jury verdict form reduced damages by less than 
ten percent, while the defendant’s tactic of calling out the anchor did not 
have any significant effect. Finally, Part IV also examines many of the 
comments mock jurors made after they rendered their decisions. Interesting-
ly, many juries did not appear to follow the jury instructions. Specifically, 
some jurors appeared to focus on the defendant’s culpability and sought to 
punish the defendant. In Part V, we discuss the limitations of our study. In 
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Part VI, we explore what our findings mean for real world litigations and 
suggest additional areas for follow-on research. 
I. Outsized Damage Awards 
Many technology products today are literally covered by hundreds of 
thousands of different patents.1 For example, a smartphone likely has pa-
tents on the user interface, the microprocessors, memory chips, communica-
tion protocols and even the software that runs on one device. But patent 
lawsuits typically only involve one of these patents. In a few larger, more 
complex cases, the plaintiff asserts a few patents. Thus, even if only the 
most valuable patents make it to trial, we would expect damages awards to 
be only a relatively small percentage of the overall sales prices of these mul-
ticomponent products. But that is not the case. In 2007, Lemley and Shapiro 
found that reasonable royalty awards for a single component that was part of 
more complex multicomponent products averaged 9.98%.2 This number 
seems particularly high given that the average royalty rate across all types of 
patents was 13.1% and for integrated product claims, 14.7%.3 Several more 
recent high profile cases suggest that the same problems continue to be a 
problem today.4
These high damages rates suggest that patent law has been overcom-
pensating patentees in these types of technology cases.5 Existing legal doc-
trine has taken the blame.6 The current test for determining reasonable roy-
 1. In 2011, RPX estimated that 250,000 patents apply to the smartphone. RPX Corp., 
Registration Statement 59 (Form S-1) (Sept. 2, 2011) (“Based on our research, we believe 
there are more than 250,000 active patents relevant to today’s smartphones. . .”). Of course, 
smartphones have become even more complicated since 2011. 
 2. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1991, 2032 tbl.1 (2007). 
 3. Id. at 2034. One would expect that the component royalty would be substantially 
smaller than rates found in other fields, but the royalties for all inventions was 13.1% and for 
integrated product claims 14.7%. See id.
 4. See, e.g., Wisconsin Alumni Research Found. v. Apple Inc., No. 14-CV-062-
WMC, 2015 WL 6755209 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 19, 2015) (jury awarded over $234 million in 
damages for a patent involving microprocessors in Apple’s iPhones); Carnegie Mellon Univ. 
v. Marvell Tech. Grp., No. 09-290, 2012 WL 6686094 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 26, 2012) (verdict form 
awarding $1.17 billion); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elec.’s Inc., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK, 2012 
WL 10208466 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012) (verdict form awarding $1.049 billion); Uniloc 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 03-440, 2009 WL 960940 (D. R.I. Apr. 8, 2009) (verdict 
form awarding approx. $582 million); Lucent Tech. Inc. v. Gateway Inc., No. 02-CV-2060 B 
(CAB), 2007 WL 892887 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2007) (verdict form awarding approx. $1.5 bil-
lion).
 5. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 2, at 2034 (“[W]e should expect to see a more sig-
nificant reduction in the royalty rate if the system were working as intended.”). 
 6. Id. (“[I]t is reasonable to conclude that the legal doctrines designed to make the 
reasonable royalty track the actual value of the patented contribution are not working, at least 
not fully.”). 
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alties consists of weighing a mind-boggling fifteen Georgia Pacific factors.7
While two Georgia-Pacific factors reflect the so-called “apportionment” 
principles—the royalty should only reflect the patent’s relative contribution 
to the overall infringing product—it is unclear how much weight juries give 
these two factors.8 Several commentators have argued that the Georgia Pa-
cific test gives juries too much discretion and leads to damages awards that 
overvalue the patent at issue.9 To aggravate the problem, the number and 
complexity of the factors hinders judges from effectively policing jury ver-
dicts.10 In response to complaints from technology companies, Congress 
worked on draft legislation to curb damages awards from 2007 to 2010.11
Yet, at the same time, an unusually activist Federal Circuit argued that legis-
lation was unnecessary and suggested that it could handle any problems in 
patent damages law.12
Although Congress eventually amended the patent laws in 2011, dam-
ages reform was not part of that legislation, most likely because of a lack of 
industry consensus.13 But the Federal Circuit followed through on its prom-
ises by issuing several decisions rejecting different types of damages evi-
dence and vacating large damages awards. In 2009, the Federal Circuit 
threw out a $358 million award against Microsoft in Lucent Technologies v. 
 7. Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), 
modified sub nom. Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 446 F.2d 295 (2d 
Cir. 1971).  Some courts are finally starting to give jury instructions that are no longer based 
on the Georgia Pacific factors.  See e.g. Northern District of California Model Patent Jury In-
struction 5.7 (updated Oct. 2019). 
 8. Factor 9 discusses the “advantages of the patent property over the old modes or de-
vices” and factor 13 the “portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the inven-
tion as distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, 
or significant features or improvements added by the infringer.” Id.
 9. Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for Reasona-
ble Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1661, 1666 (2010) (“there is a growing body 
of evidence that Georgia-Pacific has resulted in the systematic overcompensation of patent 
owners in certain industries.”); Bernard Chao, The Case for Contribution in Patent Law, 80 U.
CIN. L. REV. 97, 108 (2011) (suggesting that juries must not be applying apportionment prin-
ciples properly). 
 10. Seaman, supra note 9, at 1707 2010, BYU L. Rev at 1707 (“the amorphous nature 
of the Georgia-Pacific test makes it difficult for a jury’s reasonable royalty award to be ade-
quately reviewed during post-trial motions or on appeal”); Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lem-
ley, A Structured Approach to Calculating Reasonable Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
627, 632-33 (2010) (arguing that the complexity of the current fifteen factor test for determin-
ing reasonably royalties allows judges to “simply give up and defer to whatever the jury 
awards”).
 11. Jonas Anderson, Congress as Catalyst of Patent Reform at the Federal Circuit, 63 
AM. U. L. REV. 961, 990-99 (2014) (describing legislative efforts from 2007-2010 to reform 
patent law including provision regarding damages). 
12. Id. at 995 (describing how Chief Judge Michel stated that the Federal Circuit was 
open to altering it damages case law and invited stakeholders to raise the issues on appeal). 
 13. In 2011, the American Invents Act was passed, but the proposed damages reforms 
found in earlier drafts were not included in the final version of the legislation. Id. at 1004. 
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Gateway.14 The infringing feature was the so-called “date picker” feature, 
which allowed users to select dates without using a keyboard.15 The Federal 
Circuit noted that the date picker was “but a tiny feature of one part of a 
much larger software program [Outlook].”16 The decision identified several 
problems in the way damages were calculated. One notable flaw was how 
Lucent’s expert effectively used the value of the sale of computers loaded 
with the software rather than the patented portions of the software to calcu-
late damages.17 That allowed Lucent to frame their damages request as a 
comparatively small percentage of the overall sales base. Since sales of the 
three infringing software products were approximately $8 billion, the 8% 
that Lucent sought was still $561.9 million.18 The Federal Circuit rejected 
Lucent’s approach and vacated the damages award.19 More recent decisions 
have carried forth this analysis and now insist that royalties adequately ap-
portion damages based on the relative contribution the patent makes.20 One 
way the Federal Circuit has sought to prevent patentees from capturing the 
value of the larger product is to insist that royalties be based on the “small-
est salable unit.”21 Patentees can only base sales on a larger more complex 
product if the patented feature provides the basis for customers’ demand for 
the larger product. 
Two years after Lucent Technologies, the Federal Circuit categorically 
rejected another approach blamed for disproportionately high damages 
awards: the 25% rule of thumb. In Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft, the patent 
covered a mechanism for combating casual copying by creating a unique 
registration number used to verify that a particular copy of a program was 
authorized.22 A jury found that the Product Activation feature in Microsoft’s 
 14. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 15. Id. at 1317. The court described the patent as “generally directed to a method of 
entering information into fields on a computer screen without using a keyboard.” Id. at 1308. 
 16. Id. at 1332. 
 17. Id. at 1338-39. 
 18. Id. at 1323. 
 19. Id. at 1334. 
 20. Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Virnetx, 
Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he district court should 
have exercised its gatekeeping authority to ensure that only theories comporting with settled 
principles of appointment were allowed to reach the jury.”). 
 21. See, e.g., Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1310–11 (Fed. Cir. 
2018) (“The smallest salable unit principle directs that ‘in any case involving multi-
component products, patentees may not calculate damages based on sales of the entire prod-
uct, as opposed to the smallest salable patent-practicing unit, without showing that the demand 
for the entire product is attributable to the patented feature.’” (citation omitted)); Versata 
Software, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 717 F.3d 1255, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“[A] patentee may 
assess damages based on the entire market value of the accused product only where the pa-
tented feature creates the basis for customer demand or substantially creates the value of the 
component parts.” (quoting SnyQor, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 709 F.3d 1365, 1383 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013))). 
 22. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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Word XP, Word 2003, and Windows XP infringed the patent.23 Relying in 
large part on the 25% rule, Uniloc’s expert testified that Uniloc should be 
awarded $564,946,803.24 Under that rule, “licensees pay a royalty rate 
equivalent to 25 per cent [sic] of its expected profits for the product that in-
corporates the IP at issue.”25 While the jury did not give Uniloc all that it re-
quested, it did award $388 million. The Federal Circuit rejected the rule of 
thumb saying that it was “a fundamentally flawed tool for determining a 
baseline royalty rate in a hypothetical negotiation.”26
Legal rules like requiring apportionment, basing royalties on the small-
est saleable unit, and rejecting the 25% rule of thumb undoubtedly placed 
downward pressure on damages in multicomponent cases, but they did not 
solve the entire problem. Although patent trials are quite rare, there are still 
unusually high damages awards in multicomponent cases. Apple’s clash 
with Samsung is one prominent example. The jury initially awarded Apple 
$1.05 billion for Samsung infringing three utility patents and two design pa-
tents.27 However, these patents only covered a small portion of the technolo-
gy found in Samsung’s infringing smartphone and tablets.28 Through nu-
merous appeals, Samsung has successfully whittled away at the $1 billion 
award.29
 23. Id. at 1300-01. 
 24. Id. at 1311. 
 25. Id. at 1312(quoting Robert Goldscheider, John Jarosz, and Carla Mulhern, Use Of 
The 25 Per Cent Rule in Valuing IP, 37 LES NOUVELLES 123, 123 (2002). 
 26. Id. at 1315. 
 27. Amended Verdict Form at 15, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Inc., No. 11-CV-
01846-LHK (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012), ECF No. 1931 (awarding $1.049 billion). 
 28. The three utility patents asserted comprised of the ‘381 patent, the ‘915 patent, and 
the ‘163 patent. The ‘381 patent is directed to “a software feature known as the ‘bounce-back’ 
feature,” which is “activated when the user is scrolling through a document displayed on the 
device. If the user attempts to scroll past the end of the document, an area beyond the edge of 
the document is displayed to indicate that the user has reached the document’s end.” Apple 
Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The ‘915 patent is directed 
to the “pinch-to-zoom” gesture, and the ‘163 patent is directed to the “double-tap-to-zoom” 
functionality. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The 
four design patents asserted are the ‘677 design patent, the ‘087 design patent, the ‘305 design 
patent, and the ‘889 patent. The ‘087 and the ‘677 design patents “are directed to designs that 
Apple contends are generally embodied in the iPhone . . . . Both patents claim a minimalist 
design for a rectangular smartphone consisting of a large rectangular display occupying most 
of the phone’s front face.” 678 F.3d at 1317. The ‘305 design patent “claims the ornamental 
design of the iPhone’s graphical user interface, including the arrangement of rows of square 
icons with rounded corners.” 735 F.3d at 1357. The ‘889 design patent is “directed to the de-
sign of a tablet computer” and “depicts a rectangular tablet with a polished reflective surface 
extending to the edge of the front side of the device.” 678 F.3d at 1318. 
 29. See, Jacob Kastrenakes, Apple and Samsung Settle Seven-Year-Long Patent Fight 
Over Copying the iPhone, THE VERGE (Jun. 27, 2018, 2:59 PM) (“Most recently, the verdict 
had been whittled down to $539 million for Apple.”); see also Pamela Samuelson & Mark 
Gergen, The Disgorgement Remedy of Design Patent Law, 108 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2020) (manuscript at 16-17 n.109), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_
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But while courts throw out some disproportionately high damages 
awards, these decisions do nothing to prevent subsequent juries from issuing 
similar awards in the future.30 The problem is one of timing. Courts typically 
impose limits on damages after the jury issues its verdict. Trial courts can 
only grant a JMOL (judgment as a matter of law) discarding a damages ver-
dict or remitter after the jury has rendered its verdict. Of course, any appeal 
to the Federal Circuit takes place even later. But these ex post solutions are 
inefficient. Both the parties and the trial court expend significant time and 
resources at trial. If possible, any intervention should help juries arrive at a 
proper damages verdict in the first instance. 
The large number of Georgia Pacific factors complicate this task be-
cause it is often easy to find an argument for increased royalties under one 
of the test’s fifteen factors, and it is easy for experts to latch on to the more 
subjective factors of the test and obfuscate the jury. We hypothesize that as 
long as attorneys can continue to make colorable arguments supporting an 
extremely high damages request, that request (i.e. the anchor) will have an 
unduly high impact on the ultimate verdict. That is because jurors (like eve-
ryone) are subject to a wide variety of cognitive biases. One or more of 
these biases may be at work when juries issue disproportionate damages 
awards in multicomponent patent cases. We describe our hypotheses in 
greater detail below. 
II. The Psychology of Patent Damages 
Beginning with Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, social scientists 
have shown that people make irrational decisions in a wide variety of con-
texts.31 That is because they take mental shortcuts called heuristics. Count-
less works have now identified a variety of forms of cognitive biases.32 We 
ID3353536_code1664945.pdf?abstractid=3353536&mirid=1 (last visited Sept. 29, 2019) 
(“The $1.05 billion jury award in 2012 included damages for trade dress dilution and utility 
patent infringement as well as for design patent infringement. In post-verdict proceedings, the 
trial court adjusted the design patent award to $399 million. The 2017 jury awarded Apple 
$533.3 million for the design patent infringements, plus about $5 million as a reasonable roy-
alty for utility patent infringement.”). 
 30. Examples of damages rulings that effectively eliminate a jury decision abound. See 
Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (remanding for po-
tential new trial); Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 436 (2016) (remanded to 
determine damages again); Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1235-36 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014) (vacating jury’s damages award and remanding for further proceedings). 
 31. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124 (1974). 
 32. See e.g., BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); THE
LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith eds., 
2005); Robert P. Abelson, Psychological Status of the Script Concept, 36 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
715 (1981).
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suggest that two such biases may be at work as juries decide patent damages 
for multicomponent products.33
A. Potential Biases 
1. Saliency Bias 
A form of saliency bias may cause juries to overvalue an infringing fea-
ture.34 Saliency bias refers to the fact that individuals are more likely to fo-
cus on items or information that are more prominent (and salient) and ignore 
items and information that are less visible.35 For example, individuals that 
have been recently exposed to news about violent crime tend to overesti-
mate the likelihood of a violent crime occurring in that individual’s neigh-
borhood.36 Psychologists have theorized that saliency bias stems from peo-
ple’s limited ability to process information. Since they cannot consider all 
the relevant facts, they naturally focus on particularly salient information. 
That information then tends to exert undue influence on the individual’s de-
cision-making. 
In patent infringement cases involving multicomponent electronic 
products (e.g. a smartphone or a television), the majority of the trial time 
naturally focuses on the accused infringing feature. This is true even though 
a multicomponent product is likely to have thousands, if not hundreds of 
thousands, of other features.37 Thus, information about the accused feature is 
 33. Thomas Cotter has discussed how heuristics may affect patent damages and argued 
that courts should be aware of how these heuristics can affect both the decisions of judges and 
juries. Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Damages Heuristics, 25 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 159, 164 
(2018).
 34. See Shelley E. Taylor & Susan T. Fiske, Salience, Attention, and Attribution: Top 
of the Head Phenomena, in ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 249, 254 
(Leonard Berkowitz ed., 11th ed. 1978). 
 35. Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting Salience Bias in Designing Taxes, 28 YALE J. ON 
REG. 253, 254 (2011) (“In making decisions, individuals rely on heuristics or cognitive biases. 
One of these is salience, which refers to visibility or prominence. Individuals systematically 
focus on items or information that is prominent or salient and ignore information or items that 
are less visible.”). 
 36. Daneil Romer et al., Television News and the Cultivation of Fear of Crime, J. OF 
COMM. 88, 91, 99 (2003) (In a national sample collected in 1997, perceived risk of crime was 
related to local television news exposure.); see also Allen E. Liska & William. Baccaglini, 
Feeling Safe by Comparison: Crime in the Sewspapers, 37 SOC. PROBS. 360, 366 (1990) 
(homicide stories in particular show the strongest relationship to public fear in the local 
news); Bryan H. Reber & Yuhmin Chang, Assessing Cultivation Theory and Public Health 
Model of Crime Reporting, 21 NEWSPAPER RES. J. 91, 99 (2001) (concluding that reporting 
salient rather than common crimes may convey a message that crime is more pervasive and 
relevant to a particular community);. 
 37. See Jorge L. Contreras, Technical Standards, Standards-Setting Organizations and 
Intellectual Property: A Survey of the Literature (With an Emphasis on Empirical Approach-
es), in 2 RES. HANDBOOKS ON ECON. OF INTELL. PROP. L. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 
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particularly salient to the jury’s primary task. Jurors must focus on the ac-
cused feature to assess whether it infringes the patent. Meanwhile, infor-
mation about the thousands of other features is not relevant to infringement. 
The only time the juror is asked to consider these features is when the de-
fendant points out that they also contribute value to the product. Thus, a pa-
tent infringement trial may create a context where jurors overvalue the in-
fringing feature. 
2. Anchoring 
Another form of cognitive bias called “anchoring” may also cause juries 
to overvalue an infringing feature. Anchoring generally refers to the obser-
vation that an initial number inordinately influences an individual’s later 
numerical determinations.38 Anchoring effects have previously been demon-
strated in the context of both personal injury and punitive damages cases.39
Numerous studies have confirmed that as the demand increases, so does the 
award. Indeed, one study’s title provocatively suggests that “the more you 
ask for, the more you get.”40 Of course, attorneys are familiar with this phe-
nomenon and often ask for damages awards far in excess of what they think 
their case is worth or that the jury will issue.41 Indeed, one might suspect 
that is precisely what Apple’s attorneys were doing when they asked for a 
$100 royalty on a $199 smartphone for infringing three graphical user inter-
face patents.42 The surprisingly simple demonstrative exhibit depicted here 
was presented during the testimony of Dr. John Hauser, an MIT business 
school professor and Apple’s expert. Although Dr. Hauser testified that his 
conclusions relied on a sophisticated survey technique called “conjoint 
analysis,” his direct testimony lasted less than three minutes. There was no 
effort to explain the details of “conjoint analysis.” This may have been due 
8-10), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID3342570_code1335192.pdf?
abstractid=2900540&mirid=1 (last visited Sept. 30, 2019)(listing studies that identified thou-
sands to hundreds of thousands of patents that potentially cover various technical standards). 
 38. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 31, at 1128–30. 
 39. Reid Hastie et al., Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: Effects of Plaintiff’s Requests 
and Plaintiff’s Identity on Punitive Damage Awards, 23 L. & HUM. BEHAV., 445, 463 (1999) 
(summarizing several studies). 
 40. Gretchen B. Chapman & Brian H. Bornstein, The More You Ask for, the More You 
Get: Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 519, 522 
(1996).
 41. Ken Broda-Brahm, When Arguing Damages, “Drop Anchor” Even in Murky Wa-
ters, PERSUASIVE LITIGATOR (Aug. 29, 2011), https://www.persuasivelitigator.com/2011/08/
damages-anchoring.html (“It is now common sense among plaintiffs that you should give ju-
rors an anchor number, especially, for the less evidence-grounded general damages catego-
ries.”). 
 42. See Dan Levine, Analysis: In Apple v. Samsung, Alchemy of Damages Takes  
the Stage, REUTERS (Aug. 22, 2012, 4:31 PM), https://in.reuters.com/article/
idINL2E8JK02J20120822 (noting that the marketing expert from MIT took “all of three 
minutes”).
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to time constraints imposed by the court, or it could have been a tactical de-
cision. Apple’s attorneys could have been just trying to anchor the jury in 
the highest number it could introduce.43 Shortly thereafter, the jury returned 
a $1 billion verdict in favor of Apple.44 In sum, it is these types of inordi-
nately high anchors that may be another factor in disproportionately high 
damages awards in multicomponent patent lawsuits. 
Figure 1 
 43. Samsung unsuccessfully sought to have the expert report on conjoint analysis ex-
cluded. See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motions to Exclude Certain Expert 
Opinions, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co. LLC., No. 12-cv-00630-LHK (PSG), 2012 
WL 3793136, at *27 (Feb. 25, 2014). 
 44. See Josh Lowensohn, Jury Awards Apple More Than $1B, Finds Samsung In-
fringed, CNET (Aug. 24, 2012, 8:02 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/jury-orders-
samsung-to-pay-1b-to-apple/. That award has been reduced through subsequent litigation and 
retrial on damages. Johnny Lieu, Apple Wins $539 Million in Damages in Patent Battle with 
Samsung, MASHABLE (May 24, 2018), https://mashable.com/2018/05/24/samsung-apple-
retrial-decision/. 
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B. Potential Debiasing Strategies 
To the extent that the biases discussed above distort damages determi-
nations, the judicial system should seek ways to either eliminate or reduce 
them. We hypothesize how two potential debiasing techniques might work 
here. 
1. Imposing Frames 
Our first proposal takes advantage of the concept of coherence. Studies 
have proven that people’s relative valuations appear orderly. For example, 
one study showed that while people’s estimates of the price of everyday ob-
jects were unduly influenced by an irrelevant number (e.g. writing down 
their social security number), the same subjects performed well when asked 
which items were more or less expensive.45 This observation suggests that 
courts can make jury decision-making more accurate by providing more ref-
erence points.46 Indeed, the debiasing technique of providing more reference 
points has helped decision makers in other areas of the law, such as work-
ers’ compensation and sentencing guidelines.47
Here, we suggest that juries can create their own reference points. Judg-
es could instruct jurors to value the feature-at-issue simultaneously with the 
other features of the multicomponent device. Currently, jurors are instructed 
to determine a value for the infringing feature by itself.48 As a result, the ju-
ry’s entire focus is on the infringing feature. By prompting the jurors to val-
ue various other features contained in the multicomponent device at the 
same time, courts might be able to reduce the saliency bias. This approach is 
reinforced by the principle of coherence. A jury verdict form that forces the 
jury to simultaneously render decisions on different features necessarily re-
45. Dan Ariely, George Lowenstein & Drazen Prelec, “Coherent Arbitrariness”: Sta-
ble Demand Curves without Stable Preferences, 118 Q.J. OF ECON. 73, 77 (2003) (“Subjects, 
it seems, did not know how much they valued these items, but they did know the relative or-
dering within the categories of wine and computer accessories.”). 
 46. See Bernard Chao, The Case for Contribution in Patent Law, 80 U. CIN. L. REV.
113, 134–35 (2011) (suggesting that courts should allow defendants in multicomponent patent 
lawsuits to implead their suppliers; that will then provide the jury with another important ref-
erence point, the price of the component, for calculating damages); Reid Hastie, The Chal-
lenge to Produce Useful “Legal Numbers”, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 6, 8-9 (2011) (dis-
cussing three approaches to give decision makers more useful information to make numerical 
decisions).
 47. Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman & David Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damag-
es (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2124-25 (1998); see 
also Hillel Bavli & Reagan Mozer, The Effects of Comparable-Case Guidance on Awards for 
Pain and Suffering and Punitive Damages: Evidence from a Randomized Controlled Trial, 37 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 405 (2019) (showing that mock jury decision were less variable when 
given information on prior awards). 
 48. See, e.g., Verdict Form, Uniloc U.S.A., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 03-004 S, 2009 
WL 960940 (D.R.I. April 8, 2009). 
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quires them to also consider relative valuations. We hypothesize that to-
gether these two mechanisms will yield a more accurate valuation for an in-
fringing feature in a multicomponent suit. 
In theory, it makes sense to assess the value of a particular feature in the 
context of determining the value of all the other inputs to the product simul-
taneously. This approach is consistent with what others have proposed: as-
sessing damages by determining the incremental value of the patented fea-
ture.49 Simultaneous valuation has the added benefit of preventing 
valuations that lead to unreasonable results – namely, the patent system 
should not lead to situations where the sum of the parts are larger (at least 
not substantially larger) than the value of the product as a whole. 
In practice, neither courts nor researchers can ask people to look at 
thousands of features simultaneously. Unless they were heavily invested in 
the outcome, people do not have the time or patience to carefully perform 
these tasks.50 However, having mock jurors evaluate a few features as part 
of the defendant’s case is a closer approximation of the ideal approach than 
when the feature is valued alone in the plaintiffs’ case. 
2. Exposing the Anchor 
One of the authors has previously studied potential strategies to respond 
to anchoring in the context of medical malpractice lawsuits.51 The study 
tested three potential strategies a defendant might use against a dispropor-
tionately high damages demand: 1) offering a significantly lower anchor 
(the “counter” condition), 2) not offering an alternative number but critiqu-
ing the plaintiffs’ request (the “ignore” condition), and 3) using the plain-
tiffs’ high demand to attack the plaintiffs’ credibility (the “attack” condi-
 49. Several others have advocated measuring damages based on the incremental value 
of the patented technology. See Jorge L. Contreras & Richard J. Gilbert, A Unified Framework 
for RAND and Other Reasonable Royalties, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1451, 1499 (2015) (en-
dorsing the incremental value and explicitly excluding switching costs); Taylor infra at note 
66 at 95-96 (suggesting that damages based on the value of the patent would be “the amount 
of money that a user of patented technology can save or otherwise obtain based upon the dif-
ference between a world where the patented technology is used and a world where the patent-
ed technology is not used.”). 
 50. There are other reasons why this approach might not work. Jurors may suffer from 
cognitive overload when they have to value too many features together. See Paul E. Green & 
V. Srinivasan, Conjoint Analysis in Marketing: New Developments with Implications for Re-
search and Practice, 54 J. MARKETING 3, 8 (1990) (suggesting that upper limit may be as 
small as six people); see also Zelin Yang, Damages Royalties: An Overview of Reasonable 
Royalty Damages, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 647, 665 (2014) (discussing how limiting the 
number of features may lead to manipulation). 
 51. John Campbell, Bernard Chao, Christopher Robertson & David Yokum, Counter-
ing the Plaintiffs’ Anchor: Jury Simulations to Evaluate Damages Arguments, 101 IOWA L.
REV. 543 (2016). 
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tion).52 Although the study found that countering the plaintiffs’ $5,000,000 
demand with a significantly lower number ($50,000) was slightly more ef-
fective than attacking the demand, the difference was small. Average dam-
ages in the counter condition were $200,261 while they were $341,872 in 
the attack condition.53 The anchoring effect dominated the three attempts to 
counter it. 
Some scholars have suggested that a different tactic might work: edu-
cating jurors about their potential biases.54 One recent study sought to test 
this theory in the criminal sentencing context.55 The experiment tested four 
potential responses to a prosecutor’s anchor (i.e. demand for a long sen-
tence): (1) ignoring, (2) identifying, (3) countering (offering a lower alterna-
tive anchor), and (4) identifying and countering.56 In the two identifying 
conditions, defense counsel specifically called out the prosecutor for throw-
ing out a “ridiculously high number” and labeled it “a psychological manip-
ulation.”57 Interestingly, identifying anchoring by itself had no effect on sen-
tencing outcomes, but when it was combined with a lower anchor, the 
defense was able to significantly reduce sentencing outcomes by between 
37% and 45%.58 We sought to determine if the same tactic would be effec-
tive in determining damages in a multicomponent patent case. 
III. The Experiment 
Although our primary subject of interest is assessing how juries decide 
damages in multicomponent patent cases, our experiment was based on a 
product mislabeling case rather than a patent infringement case. Our exper-
imental design required us to identify and describe three different features in 
a multicomponent product and repeatedly switch the context in which mock 
jurors valued these three features. Thus, in different scenarios, either the 
plaintiff or the defendant would be explaining the value of any given fea-
ture. When discussing features, we sought to use the same arguments re-
 52. Id. at 555; see also, Tina L. Decker, Effects of Counter-Anchoring Damages Dur-
ing Closing Argument, 49–50 (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kansas) 
(on file with authors). 
 53. Campbell et al. supra note 51, at 560. 
 54. Rebecca K. Helm, Valerie P. Hans & Valerie F. Reyna, Trial by Numbers, 27 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 107, 132 (2017); Wilson et al., A New Look at Anchoring Ef-
fects: Basic Anchoring and Its Antecedents, 125 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 387 
(1996) (warning participants about their potential bias mitigated but did not nullify anchoring 
biases).
 55. Christopher T. Stein & Michelle Drouin, Cognitive Bias in the Courtroom: Com-
bating the Anchoring Effect in Criminal Sentencing, SSRN (uploaded June 23, 2017)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2991611. 
 56. Id. at 11. 
 57. Id. at 19. 
 58. Id. at 31. The 37% reduction occurred in low anchor condition and the 45% reduc-
tion occurred in the high anchor condition. Id.
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gardless of whether that feature was being discussed by the plaintiff or the 
defendant. Introducing infringement arguments would have frustrated that 
design because the parties would never discuss whether features not in suit 
infringed a patent. Thus, the product mislabeling lawsuit gave us the best 
opportunity to isolate the cognitive biases we were seeking to test. 
What follows is a description of the “basic” case that is common to all 
the different scenarios mock jurors viewed. The case involves the mislabel-
ing of the fictional Ultra smartphone. Both the marketing and actual packag-
ing mistakenly referred to a feature that was not present in smartphones the 
defendant manufacturer sold. The plaintiffs are the class of consumers that 
purchased the Ultra smartphone for an average of $489/smartphone. The de-
fendant does not dispute liability. Moreover, both sides agree that the de-
fendant should pay the consumers the difference between the phone as de-
scribed and the phone as delivered. However, they differ on what that 
amount is. In pre-testing, mock jurors sought to punish the defendant for its 
conduct when assessing damages. Consequently, the basic case was revised 
to include facts that minimized the defendant’s blame. The defendant sent 
accurate instructions to a third-party marketing company that made the mis-
take. Unfortunately, that party is bankrupt, and the defendant manufacturer 
has willingly accepting responsibility but is disputing the value of the miss-
ing feature. 
All the different versions consist of three narrated PowerPoint parts: a 
judge, the plaintiffs’ attorney and the defendant’s attorney. The presenta-
tions were combined and rendered into a single video.59 A judge introduces 
the basic dispute and provides short jury instructions after the two sides’ ar-
guments. The plaintiff points to various benefits that the promised feature-
at-issue has and asks the jury to award $99 per smartphone. In response, the 
defendant downplays the significance of the missing feature-at-issue’s bene-
fits and points to all the other features found in the smartphone. As part of 
this argument, the defendant highlights three particular features found in the 
smartphone and also briefly mentions a host of other important features that 
contribute to the value of the smartphone. The defendant’s bottom line is 
that $99 is far too much given the countless number of features in the 
smartphone, and the defendant suggests that $4.85/smartphone should be 
sufficient compensation.60 Just as they would in a real trial, mock jurors 
were then asked to assess damages by determining the value of the missing 
feature. But unlike in a real trial, we also asked mock jurors to estimate the 
value of the other features that the defendant specifically identified as con-
tributing to the value of the smartphone and everything else (i.e., all the un-
 59. Each presentation used a different person’s voice to help participants distinguish 
between the different roles of judge, plaintiffs’ counsel, and defendant’s counsel. 
 60. While pre-testing the experiment, the defendant suggested that $1.25 should be suf-
ficient compensation. However, several mock jurors suggested that $1.25 was absurdly low. 
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mentioned features) that went into the smartphone. As explained below, 
these questions were asked in three different ways. 
The task that our mock jurors were given is substantially similar to what 
real patent juries must do when they decide damages in a multicomponent 
case. First, in patent cases, the balance of the case focuses on the infringing 
feature. Here, the balance of the case focused on the missing feature. Sec-
ond, the patent plaintiff typically demands a relatively large royalty as a 
percentage of the overall product. Here, the plaintiffs asked for $99 in dam-
ages. Since the smartphone sold for $489, the request was slightly less than 
20% of the price of the smartphone. We selected that number because it 
seemed irrationally high, but still within the range of what a plaintiff might 
actually request.61 Third, defendants in patent cases invariably attempt to 
diminish the value of the infringing feature by pointing to everything else 
found in the infringing product. The defendant in our case discussed three 
other particular features that contributed to the value of the smartphone and 
briefly mentioned several other categories of features as well. 
A. The Manipulations 
In order to test the cognitive biases and various potential counters de-
scribed above, manipulations were made in three different dimensions. This 
allowed us to conduct a 3x3x2 between-subjects experiment with a total of 
18 experimental conditions as illustrated in Table 1. We describe each of the 
manipulations in more detail below. 
Table 1 
Experimental Conditions 
 Camera Storage Security
Ind5/ 
No Debias 
1 7 13 
Tog5/ 
No Debias 
2 8 14 
Tog8/ 
No Debias 
3 9 15 
Ind5/ 
Debias Anchor 
4 10 16 
Tog5/ 
Debias Anchor 
5 11 17 
Tog8/ 
Debias Anchor 
6 12 18 
 61. Since Lemley and Shapiro observed that damages average slightly less than 10% in 
multicomponent cases, a damages demand reflecting slightly less than 20% of the product’s 
price seemed realistic. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 2, and accompanying text. 
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1. Testing Saliency & Anchors (x3) 
Our first manipulation involved three Ultra smartphone features: (A) 
the camera quality (12-megapixel vs. 8-megapixel), (B) the amount of stor-
age capacity (128 gigabyte vs. 96 gigabyte), and (C) the type of encryption 
technology (6-key vs. 4-key). 
Early testing of our experiment revealed that some mock jurors thought 
that the defendant should fix the problem by adding features through a soft-
ware upgrade. To eliminate this possibility, all the features that were in-
volved in the final experiment were part of the smartphone’s hardware. The 
defendant’s presentation also informs the mock jurors that it could not simp-
ly substitute a smartphone with the missing feature because the defendant 
actually did not make such a phone. 
In the first version, the misrepresentation related to the type of built-in 
camera.62 The packaging and advertising said that the smartphone had a 12-
megapixel camera when it really only had an 8-megapixel camera. The 
plaintiff explains why this feature is beneficial and demands $99/unit. The 
defendant responds, in part, by pointing to other features to suggest that the 
smartphone is far more than its camera. Among those features are the large 
128 GB storage capacity and the sophisticated 6-key encryption. The de-
fendant argues that $4.85/unit is entirely adequate to compensate the plain-
tiffs.
In the 2nd version of this manipulation, we rotate the storage capacity in-
to the plaintiffs’ case while rotating the camera feature out of the plaintiffs’ 
case and into the defendant’s case.63 In the 3rd version, we rotate the 6-key 
encryption feature into the plaintiffs’ case while the defendant discusses the 
other two features.64
Since we ask mock jurors to assess damages based on the missing fea-
ture and to value the other features as well, we can observe if the value of 
each feature changes based on the context. Our hypothesis is that mock ju-
rors would assign more value when each feature is the focus of the plain-
tiffs’ lawsuit. That would suggest that a combination of the saliency effect 
and anchoring is pushing damages upwards. 
We selected these three features because they represented a range of 
different values. Presumably, most customers understand the value of more 
memory and believe it is useful. Thus, we expected that mock jurors would 
award slightly higher damages for this feature. However, it was unclear to 
us that people would think that a 12-megapixel camera was significantly 
more valuable than an 8-megapixel camera. While almost everyone uses the 
 62. Conditions 1-6. 
 63. Conditions 7-12. 
 64. Conditions 13-18. 
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camera in their smartphones, most people don’t need an extremely high-
quality image. Thus, we expected mock jurors to award slightly less damag-
es for the less powerful camera. Finally, we thought that so long as the 
smartphone was password protected, most people would not care about the 
number of digits comprising the password. Accordingly, we expected dam-
ages for the difference between the 6-key password and 4-key password to 
be nominal. 
Because only the plaintiff suggested that particular features were worth 
$99, this manipulation only allowed us to measure the combined effect of 
any saliency and anchoring biases. While we could have designed an exper-
iment that attempted to isolate the saliency effect from anchoring, we chose 
a design that more closely approximated how damages are litigated in real 
cases. 
2. Jury Verdicts (x3) 
A second manipulation focused on a potential counter to the anchoring 
bias. This counter attempted to change the way mock jurors assessed dam-
ages. First, our control condition (Independent 5) reflected the way real ju-
rors assess damages. The verdict simply asked the mock juror to assess 
damages on the feature-in-suit – either the camera, storage, or security fea-
ture. The specific instructions told mock jurors to measure damages by 
comparing the difference between what was promised and what was re-
ceived.65 After that task was complete, mock jurors were sent to another 
page (that did not permit backtracking). This page asked the mock juror to 
rank the value of the feature-in-suit, the two features that were the subject of 
defendant’s presentation (two of camera, storage, and security that were not 
the feature-in-suit) as well as improved voice recognition software, and 
“[t]he combination of everything else in the Ultra Smartphone.” They were 
then asked to assess how valuable the three features and “everything else” 
were in dollars. 
In a second condition (Together 5), we asked the mock jurors to per-
form all the same tasks in our first condition except we asked them to rank 
 65. This instruction looks much like a patent jury instruction would if it focused on the 
next best non-infringing alternative, an idea many commentators have endorsed. See, e.g.,
Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 2, at 2039 (“the danger that reasonable royalties will be set too 
high in component cases will be sharply reduced if the courts base their estimates of reasona-
ble royalties on an assessment of the value of the patented component in comparison with the 
next best, noninfringing alternative way to create that component”); Douglas A. Melamed & 
William F. Lee, Breaking the Vicious Cycle of Patent Damages, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 385, 
422 (2016) (“Properly understood, however, the alternatives put a ceiling on the amount a 
willing licensee would pay ex ante because it would not pay more than the patent is worth 
com-pared the alternative of not taking a license.”); David O. Taylor, Using Reasonable Roy-
alties to Value Patented Technology, 49 GA. L. REV. 79, 96 (2014) (“All approaches consider 
the value of the patented technology as compared with the next best alternative technolo-
gy . . .”). 
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the five items first and then value the five items together (including the fea-
ture-in-suit).66 In scenarios with this condition, the final instruction in the 
jury verdict form said, “Please tell us what damages you award the plaintiffs 
as well as what value you attributed to other features of the Ultra 
smartphone that defendants identified.” The feature-in-suit was listed fol-
lowed by each of the other features identified. 
Our third condition (Together 8) was substantially like our second con-
dition.67 However, three more features that the defendant briefly mentioned 
were added to the jury verdict form. They were: “the tempered shatter re-
sistant glass”, “the user-friendly backup system,” and “allowing the 
smartphone to communicate over wireless networks” (i.e., Wi-Fi). 
By asking the jury to assess the value of the other features at the same 
time they assessed damages for the feature-at-issue, the jury verdict manipu-
lation allowed us to examine whether forcing context on the mock juror’s 
decision making process results in a lower damages award than it otherwise 
would. Our hypothesis is that mock jurors will place a lower value on the 
feature-at-issue when valuing all of the features together as compared to 
valuing the feature-at-issue individually without consideration of the other 
features not at issue in the case. We also suspect that adding more features 
to the jury form will increase that effect. 
3. The Defendant’s Argument (x2) 
To test whether defendants could debias the plaintiffs’ anchor with an 
argument that specifically says the plaintiff is using an anchor, we created 
two experimental conditions. In the control condition, the defendant said 
nothing about anchoring. However, in the “Debias Anchor” condition, the 
defendant smartphone manufacturer argued that: “[t]he plaintiffs are only 
throwing out the $100 number to anchor your view in this ridiculously high 
number; it is a well-known psychological manipulation.” If the results of 
previous studies are true, our hypothesis is that mock jurors will return a 
lower damages award in the trial variants that include the counter-anchor 
argument as compared to the trial variants that do not include the counter-
anchor argument. 
B. The Mock Jurors 
In the summer of 2018, we performed an online 3x3x2 between-
subjects experiment. Participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical 
Turk, an online crowd-sourcing marketplace, and each participant was paid 
 66. Conditions 2, 5, 8, 11, 14, and 17. 
 67. Conditions 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, and 18. 
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$3.00 each.68 Each participant was randomly assigned to one of 18 experi-
mental conditions. In our initial experiment, we had an implementation is-
sue with four of our experimental conditions.69 Consequently, we dropped 
all the data from those four conditions and ran them again. We then com-
bined the two data sets for our analysis. Although this approach means that 
the randomization was less than ideal, we have no reason to believe that the 
two populations were systematically different. 
Depending on the condition, mock jurors watched a video that lasted 
between 10 minutes 36 seconds to 14 minutes and 3 seconds. Together 
1,059 mock jurors (847 in the first run and 212 in the second run) passed 
two attention check questions and were allowed to submit a verdict. We 
then ran a series of quality checks. The quality checks were designed to 
eliminate mock jurors who did not take the task seriously. First, we disquali-
fied mock jurors that valued too many features as $0 on the theory that they 
were rushing through the verdict form without really considering the value 
of all the features. For the Independent5 and Together5 jury verdict forms, 
we excluded mock jurors that valued three or more at $0. For the Together8 
scenario, we excluded mock jurors that valued five or more items at $0. 
This filter disqualified sixty-eight mock jurors. We also disqualified another 
four mock jurors that valued the feature-in-suit at $0 on the theory that they 
were not taking the jury instructions seriously. Finally, we disqualified an-
other fourteen mock jurors who valued any single feature at $489 or above 
for the same reason, since the entire smartphone itself was valued at $489 
(and both plaintiff and defendant stipulated to this fact). This left 973 valid 
responses. 
Of the valid responses, 497 participants identified as female, 474 identi-
fied as male, and 2 identified as neither. The sample was younger, more ed-
ucated, less racially diverse, and more politically liberal than the population 
 68. Mechanical Turk (“MTurk”) has become a large and robust platform for social sci-
ence research, with proven reliability through the replication of many known results. See Ad-
am J. Berinsky, Gregory A. Huber & Gabriel S. Lenz, Evaluating Online Labor Markets for 
Experimental Research: Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk, 20 POL. ANALYSIS 351, 362–63 
(2012) (successfully replicating three experiments using MTurk); Gabriele Paolacci, Jesse 
Chandler & Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis, Running Experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 5 
JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 411, 415-17 (2010) (replicating three classical experiment 
on MTurk and finding that MTurk workers “exhibit the class heuristics, biases and pay atten-
tion to directions at least as much as subjects from traditional sources”). 
 69. In two cases, we omitted the link to the video and mock jurors assigned to those 
conditions understandably failed attention checks. In two others conditions, we realized that 
the jury verdict form did not precisely match those in other conditions. Consequently, we dis-
carded the data from those conditions, reran conditions 8, 9, 11 & 12, and combined the two 
datasets. While having our respondents divided in non-random fashion is obviously not ideal, 
we have no reason to believe that the two MTurk respondent pools were systematically differ-
ent.
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at large; gender and median income, however, were more representative of 
the U.S. Census data.70
IV. Results 
Although our results were consistent with what Lemley & Shapiro ob-
served for real patent awards, the results of our experiment still surprised 
us.71 Given that the average price of the Ultra smartphone was $489, we 
were struck by the large size of the awards in all the conditions. As shown 
in Table 2 below, damages for the higher resolution camera (12-megapixel 
vs. 8-megapixel) were $68.59 (n=308). Damages for the higher storage 
amount were $57.80 (n=299). As predicted, the lowest damages awards 
were for the increased security feature (6-digit encryption vs. 4-digit en-
cryption), but they were still $43.49 (n=366). 
Given the tens of thousands of features in a smartphone, we were quite 
surprised that at least some of these numbers weren’t much lower. Perhaps 
the price of the security feature was the most surprising. We attempted to 
identify both features that consumers valued (i.e. more storage) and those 
that they did not value at all (i.e. 6-digit passcode vs 4-digit passcode to un-
lock a smartphone) with the higher resolution camera falling somewhere in 
the middle. As it turns out, mock jurors viewed the high-resolution camera 
as the most valuable of the three tested features. 
A. Features Are More Valuable in the Plaintiffs’ Case 
Our first hypothesis is that a combination of saliency bias and anchor-
ing increases damages awards. To test this theory, we compared the damag-
es that mock jurors awarded when the feature was part of the plaintiffs’ suit 
with the value when mock jurors assessed that feature when it was part of 
the defendant’s suit. 
For two of the three features (camera and security), the values de-
creased significantly when they were moved from the plaintiffs’ case to the 
defendant’s case. However, for our third feature, storage, we found no effect 
at all. These results are depicted in Table 2 below. The first column repre-
sents the average value of the feature when it was the feature-in-suit (i.e. 
part of the plaintiffs’ case). The second column represents the average value 
of the same feature when the defendant discussed that feature in order to 
 70. Specifically, the sample demographics are as follows: mean and median age 36.33 
and 34 years, respectively; 81.4% White, 9.5% African American, 5.3% Asian, 1.4% Ameri-
can Indian, and the remainder classified as Other; 7.8% Hispanic; 51.5% with a bachelor’s 
degree or higher; and 52.2% preferred Democrats, 28.8% preferred Republicans, and 19% had 
no political preference. 
 71.  Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 2 at 2032 tbl.1 (observing an average royalty rate of 
9.98% for a single component in a larger multicomponent product). 
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minimize the value of the feature-in-suit. Both the first and second columns 
also contain the number of participants (n) representing that category. The 
third and fourth columns contain calculations to determine statistical signif-
icance using t-tests.72
Table 2 
Average Damages, Feature-in-Suit vs. Feature Not in Suit 
 Plaintiff 
Average 
(n) 
Defendant 
Average 
(n) 
p-value 
(t-test) 
Effect Size 95% 
Confidence In-
tervals 
Camera $65.89 
(308) 
$56.95 
(665) 
p < 0.001 -$3.49 
-$14.40 
Storage $57.80 
(299) 
$60.84 
(674) 
p = 0.34  $9.28 
-$3.19 
Security $43.49 
(366) 
$23.46 
(607) 
p < 1.5e-15 -$15.23 
-$24.81 
The average value of the higher quality camera decreased 13.57%. In 
absolute terms, that was an $8.94 reduction with a 95% confidence interval 
that the effect was between -$3.49 and -$14.40. As for percentage of overall 
value, the average value of the improved security feature had a much larger 
drop in value, 46.1% which represented a $20.03 decrease. The 95% confi-
dence interval was -$15.23 to - $24.81. In both cases, the results yielded ex-
tremely low p values providing a high level of confidence in the findings. 
Thus, these two comparisons support our hypothesis. Some combination of 
the saliency bias and anchoring effect cause mock jurors to value the two 
features higher when it is part of the plaintiffs’ lawsuit. 
However, the results for the storage feature were not consistent with 
this hypothesis. When the storage feature was at issue, the average damages 
value was $57.80, whereas the average damages value for the storage fea-
ture when it was not at issue was $60.84. Indeed, the minimal difference 
suggests that the saliency bias and anchoring effect might not be operating 
in this context. However, we did see an effect when we examined how 
mock jurors ranked the value of the different features. 
 72. We did not perform a regression analysis comparing the feature in suit vs. value 
when it was not in suit. Such an analysis would require us to use each response three times, 
once for the feature in suit, and again for each of the other features. The value of the feature in 
suit and features NOT in suit are related because the total will presumably be close to the val-
ue of the entire product, $489. For the results of a standard regression analysis to be reliable, 
the different outcomes have to be independent. Thus, a regression analysis was not appropri-
ate here. 
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After they determined damages, mock jurors were also asked to rank 
the value of the different features in the smartphone from highest to lowest. 
In two of the three jury verdict forms (Traditional and Together5), mock ju-
rors ranked five features: the three features of interest (camera, storage, and 
security) as well as the “newest and most accurate voice recognition soft-
ware” and “a combination of everything else that went in the [] 
smartphone.” In the Together8 jury verdict, we added three more features 
for the mock jury to rank. They were: “tempered shatter resistant glass,” 
“user friendly backup system,” and “[a]llowing the smartphone to com-
municate over wireless networks (in other words Wi-Fi).” The results are 
shown in Table 3 below.73 The first number shows the average rank for the 
feature in interest, the second number shows how many features participants 
were asked to rank in that experimental condition and the third number in 
parentheticals shows how many valid responses are found in that condition. 
Comparing the ranking of the three primary features when they were 
part of the plaintiffs’ lawsuit against their ranking when they were part of 
the defendant’s suit gives us another way to test the combination of saliency 
and anchoring. In every case, the ranking of the feature was higher when it 
was part of the plaintiff’s case than when it was part of the defendant’s case. 
Moreover, we performed a Wilcoxon rank-sum test that showed that all the 
results were statistically significant (p < .0001). 
Table 3 
Average Ranking for Each Feature 
 Ranking in Plaintiffs’
Case (n) 
Ranking in Defendant’s 
Case (n) 
Camera Trad/Together5 1.74/5 (201) 2.78/5 (459)
Camera Together 2.22/8 (95) 3.35/8 (187)
Storage Trad/Together5 1.81/5 (208) 2.35/5 (461)
Storage Together8 2.42/8 (81) 2.87/8 (201)
Security Trad/Together5 2.73/5 (251) 3.88/5 (418)
Security Together8 3.50/8 (106) 5.09/8 (176)
(p < .0001 for all comparisons between Ranking Plaintiffs’ case and Rank-
ing Defendant’s case). 
Notably, unlike our monetary value analysis, the ranking of the storage 
feature dropped significantly when it was moved from the plaintiffs’ case to 
the defendant’s case. These results certainly suggest that mock jurors think 
about features differently when they are part of the plaintiffs’ case as op-
 73. The total number of participants in Table 3 was 951, 23 less than in Table 2 which 
indicates that 22 mock jurors completed the valuation question and then dropped out before 
completing the ranking questions. 
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posed to being part of the defendant’s case. Oddly, that different perspective 
does not always affect monetary valuations. We can theorize why the valua-
tion of the storage feature did not change when it moved to the defendant’s 
case. First, the amount of storage may be one of the few features that mock 
jurors have experience valuing. Smartphones often price different models 
with different amounts of storage. Although those pricing differences often 
represent more than storage, mock jurors may not understand that subtlety, 
or they may simply be using those prices as reference points. Indeed, it is 
possible that mock jurors did a quick online search to see how storage was 
priced. In contrast, mock jurors are probably less familiar with the number 
of megapixels in their smartphone camera, and even if they are, it is unclear 
how to tease out the price of that feature from different smartphone models. 
Finally, jurors are probably the least familiar with how much more valuable 
6-digit encryption is as compared to 4-digit encryption. In fact, we simply 
made up this feature believing that mock jurors will attach very little value 
to it. Thus, it may be that the cognitive biases play a larger role in decision 
making when individuals have less personal information they can access. 
Finally, we should note that our results probably underestimate the real 
size of the saliency/anchoring effect. That is because the plaintiffs’ and de-
fendant’s valuation arguments were not precisely the same. Specifically, the 
defendant explained why the feature-in-suit was not valuable. However, 
there was no counterpart to this argument in the plaintiffs’ case. The plain-
tiff never argued that the “other” features that the defendant discussed were 
not valuable. If we assume that the defendant’s arguments placed some 
downward pressure on the mock juror’s valuations of the feature-in-suit, the 
value of the features at issue were lower than they otherwise would have 
been. Of course, we could have omitted the defendant’s argument. Howev-
er, the omission of such an obvious argument has its dangers too. Mock ju-
rors might have interpreted that omission to be a concession that the plain-
tiffs’ arguments were correct. Consequently, we chose to keep the 
argument. This had the added benefit of making our presentation more real-
istic. 
B. Valuing Multiple Features Together Reduced Damages 
Our second hypothesis was that requiring mock jurors to assess multiple 
features simultaneously would reduce any saliency effect by focusing their 
attention on the value of other features and forcing to think coherently about 
the value of different features. In short, we found that our novel jury verdict 
form reduced damages modestly. 
The results of varying the jury verdicts are found in Table 4. The sec-
ond column shows the average damages awards relying on the traditional 
jury verdict form, which simply asks the jury to determine damages for the 
feature-in-suit. The damages for three features are $68.25 for the higher res-
olution camera, $61.79 for the additional storage, and $46.95 for the im-
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proved security feature. The Together5 column provides the average dam-
ages for the same features when the jury verdict form asked mock jurors to 
rank five features and then value those five features together. Damages were 
uniformly smaller ($66.52 for the camera, $56.96 for storage, and $39.15 
for security), but the differences were not large and in fact quite small for 
the camera, $1.73. 
Table 4 
Average Damages by Jury Verdict Form 
 Independent
Avg. Damages 
(Traditional) 
(n) 
Together5
Avg. Damages 
(n) 
Together8
Avg. Damages 
(n) 
Camera $68.25 (108) $66.52 (106) $62.65 (97)  
Storage $61.79 (119) $56.96 (95) $53.15 (85) 
Security $46.95 (131) $39.15 (126) $44.34 (109) 
Two results stand out. The traditional verdict form yields the highest re-
sult for every feature. But there does not appear to be much difference be-
tween the Together5 and Together8 verdicts. We performed a regression 
analysis to see if these differences were significant. In our basic model, the 
average damages were $69.34 when the traditional verdict was used.74 The 
Together5 verdict form decreased damages by $5.04, but the results were 
not quite statistically significant (p=.09).75 The Together8 verdict had a 
slightly larger effect lowering damages by $5.44, but again this effect was 
not quite statistically significant (p=.08). In an attempt to obtain more statis-
tical power, we combined the results of Together 5 and Together 8. This 
model predicted that when mock jurors had to value other features together 
with the feature-in-suit, the together verdict forms lowered damages by 
$5.44. Presumably because of larger combined sample size, these results 
were statistically significant (p=.049).76
In short, we found that changing the jury verdict form to require the ju-
rors to value many features together lowered damages modestly. A superfi-
cial look at the descriptive statistics also might suggest that the more fea-
 74. See Table 2 in Appendix A. 
 75. See Table 3 in Appendix A. The 95% confidence interval was between -15.9% and 
+1.4%. 
 76. Id. The 95% confidence interval suggested that the together verdict forms reduced 
damages between -15.1% to -0.03%. 
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tures jurors value, the lower the damages. While that may very well be true, 
our results say nothing about this hypothesis. Our sample size was too small 
to determine if differences of these sizes were significant. 
C. Exposing the Anchor Had No Effect 
Our third hypothesis is that mock jurors would be less susceptive to an 
anchor if they were expressly told about that bias. Consequently, in half of 
our scenarios, the defendant accused the plaintiffs of asking for an irration-
ally high damages number to “anchor” mock jurors around that number. 
We found no statistical differences when the defendant explicitly called 
out the plaintiffs for anchoring. As Table 5 illustrates, when the defendant 
employed the debiasing technique, average damages decreased between 
$0.22 and $5.23 depending on the feature at issue. Using t-tests we calculat-
ed 95% confidence intervals. All the intervals crossed zero indicating that 
none of these decreases were statistically significant. Our regression analy-
sis examined conditions for each feature in suit, but it also failed to find a 
significant effect.77
Table 5 
Debiasing the Anchoring Effect 
 Control 
Average 
(n) 
Debias An-
chor
Average 
(n) 
p-value 95% Confidence 
Intervals 
Camera $66.00 
(159) 
$65.78
(149) 
0.96 $-7.71 to $8.14  
Storage $57.88 
(152) 
$57.72
(148) 
0.97 $-9.60 to $9.92 
Security $46.03 
(188) 
$40.80
(178) 
0.22 $-3.18 to $13.66 
In short, we did not find that exposing the plaintiffs’ anchor in combination 
with providing a lower counter anchor reduced damages as compared to 
simply providing a lower counter anchor.
D. Demographics 
Before the experiment began, we asked a variety of basic demographic 
questions. The only area where we found significant demographic effects 
was in political ideology. Mock jurors were asked to identify their political 
preference on a seven-point Likert scale: Strong Democrats, Democrats, 
 77. See Table 1 in Appendix A. 
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Slight Democrats, No Preference, Slight Republicans, Republicans, and 
Strong Republicans. Our regression analysis showed that jurors who favored 
Democrats awarded higher damages than jurors who favored Republicans. 
For example, the difference between those jurors that strongly favored 
Democrats and the different categories of Republicans ranged from $12.85 
to 16.07.78 Other empirical studies regarding civil litigation damages awards 
show similar effects of Republican mock-jurors awarding lower damages 
than Democrat mock-jurors.79
E. Mock Jury Comments 
We asked mock jurors to provide written comments about the basis for 
their decisions and their views on the case. These comments revealed some 
interesting insights on how mock jurors made their decisions. In particular, 
their comments revealed a disconnect between the jury instructions and the 
decisions that at least some mock jurors made. 
Both the judge and the jury verdict forms instructed mock jurors to as-
sess damages by determining the difference in value between “what the 
plaintiffs were promised” and “what they actually received.”80 This instruc-
tion was designed to mimic the question that patent cases ask.81 We were 
curious whether mock jurors would follow these instructions as they made 
their damages determinations. Other studies have shown that jurors some-
times do not follow instructions and simply rely on their own intuitions 
about what is just.82
To get a sense of what motivated the decision of our mock jurors, we 
asked them to answer three questions after they filled out the jury verdict 
 78. See Table 4 in Appendix A. 
 79. See, e.g., Hastie, supra note 39, at 455 (“One other individual difference, political 
preference, appeared to be related to awards when considered by itself; Republicans set lower 
awards than mock-jurors with more liberal political orientations (r = +.21, p < .05), although 
this variable did not enter significantly into the summary linear model.”). 
 80. For example, the jury verdict form for the camera scenario with the traditional ver-
dict form that only asked for the jury to calculate damages said “To determine the plaintiffs’ 
damages, you must determine the difference in value in what the plaintiffs were promised, an 
Ultra smartphone with a 12-Megapixel camera, and what they actually received, an Ultra 
smartphone with a 8-Megapixel camera. What damages do you award the plaintiffs for each 
smartphone they purchased?” The judge gave a similar instruction verbally during his presen-
tation.
 81. The Supreme Court has defined patent damages in terms of its compensatory func-
tion – that is, “the difference between [the patent owner’s] pecuniary condition after the in-
fringement, and what his condition would have been if the infringement had not occurred.” 
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507 (1964). 
 82. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Deterrence Instructions: What Jurors Won’t Do, in
PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE 142, 164 (Cass Sunstein et al. eds., 2002) (finding 
that mock jurors “appear quite willing to abandon the jury instructions when they have other 
rationales for setting punitive damages that they find to be either more convenient or more 
compelling.”). 
Fall 2019] Saliency, Anchors & Frames 29 
form. The first question asked mock jurors to, “[e]xplain why you gave the 
plaintiff the amount you did.” The second and third questions asked them to 
“[e]xplain what you thought” of the plaintiffs’ and defendant’s arguments. 
The following responses suggest that many jurors appeared to try to faith-
fully follow the instructions. 
Juror 73 Memory is one of the most expensive upgrades in new phones,
market rate is about $100 to go from 64 to 128 GB. So going 
from 96 to 128 should be about $50. 
Juror 704 The difference in price, according to the plaintiff, between a 4-
character passcode Ultra smartphone and a 6-character passcode 
Ultra smartphone is $99. That means plaintiffs should receive 
the difference in the price between what they paid for what they 
were getting and what they actually got. 
Juror 796 I chose that amount because I felt that was the amount the extra 
storage was worth. I also chose that amount because I felt cus-
tomers would have paid less if they knew about the true storage. 
However, other mock jurors appeared to ignore the jury instructions and 
assessed damages based on other factors. Many of these mock jurors fo-
cused on the defendant’s blameworthy conduct. These mock jurors wanted 
to either punish the defendant or deter the defendant or others from engag-
ing in this kind of conduct again. The following comments are representa-
tive of this view. 
Juror 215 Customers chose to buy this phone because it had that security
feature which didn’t exist. The company misrepresented the 
phone. 
Juror 237 I believe that the damages sustained by the plaintiff are negligi-
ble, and that even $5 was perhaps being a bit too generous. 
There should, however, be some compensation for a falsely ad-
vertised feature than [sic] cannot be changed. 
Juror 641  Yes, the smartphone has other important features but they in-
tended to mislabel the boxes to mislead their customers, they are 
untrustworthy and should be punished. 
We observed these kinds of punitive responses in pre-testing and modi-
fied our basic case to minimize the manufacturer’s fault by placing all the 
blame on a negligent third-party contractor that was now bankrupt. Appar-
ently, this revision was not entirely effective. Some jurors still found suffi-
cient fault with the defendant and apparently calculated damages based on 
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blameworthiness. These comments are consistent with the Hans-Reyna gist-
based model of decision-making.83 That model suggests that jurors engage 
in gist-based reasoning (i.e. damages should be low, medium or high) to de-
termine damage awards. Once they determine damages are warranted, they 
will make an ordinal gist judgment about the amount of damages that are 
appropriate (e.g. low or high).84 As part of that process, jurors will consider 
the defendant’s culpability (e.g. degree of negligence).85
This is an example of fusion, a process where jurors allow evidence of 
liability to influence damage decisions or evidence of damages to influence 
liability decisions.86 For our purposes, the most relevant studies have found 
that mock jurors tend to award higher damages when the underlying con-
duct is more blameworthy.87 In our case, this appears to be true even when 
the level of culpability was small. 
But the high average damage awards are clearly not entirely attributable 
to the defendant’s bad conduct. If we look back at the first set of comments 
above, we observe that some mock jurors appeared to faithfully follow the 
jury instructions and still arrived at substantial damages numbers. Still other 
jurors appeared to simply split the difference between what the plaintiffs 
demanded and what the defendant suggested was fair. Below are two repre-
sentative comments. 
Jury 692 i [sic] felt that $99 was too high so I just split the amount. I feel 
the customer’s [sic] could have returned the phone. 
Juror 832 . . . . What the defendant suggests is an appropriate reparation 
(appx $4 and some change) does not seem adequate given the 
significant different [sic] in storage that was promised; yeah, 
they didn’t intend on falsely advertising their product, but they 
are ultimately responsible for their product—including manag-
ing all parties involved with the marketing of their product. The 
 83. See Valerie P. Hans & Valerie F. Reyna, To Dollars from Sense: Qualitative to 
Quantitative Translation in Jury Damage Awards, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 120, 146 
(2011).
 84. Id. at 129-30. 
 85. Valerie F. Reyna et al., The Gist of Juries: Testing a Model of Damage Award De-
cision Making, 21 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 280, 291 (2015) (describing an experiment 
where jury perceptions of negligence predicted damages awards). 
 86. See Roselle L. Wissler et al., The Impact of Jury Instructions on the Fusion of Lia-
bility and Compensatory Damages, 25 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 125, 125–39 (2001) (fusion refers 
both to the concept that liability facts influence jury decision on damages and that damage 
facts influence their decision on liability). 
 87. See, e.g., John M. Darley & Charles W. Huff, Heightened Damage Assessment as a 
Result of the Intentionality of the Damaging-Causing Act, BRIT. J. OF PSYCHOL. 29, 181-88 
(1990) (showing higher damages when defendant’s actions were more intentional); Chapman 
& Bornstein, supra note 40, (clearer evidence of the danger of birth control pills caused jurors 
to give higher damages); Dale W. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB.
L. REV. 744, 760 (1959) (clearer evidence of liability led to higher compensatory damages). 
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plaintiffs’ demand for $99 also felt excessive because, again, in 
the actual sense—they got what they paid for. But I also under-
stand they may have chosen a different product if they realized 
the product was not what it seemed, so I empathize with them on 
that point. Given that there is some merit to both arguments, I 
decided to split down the middle (roughly) at $40. 
Others have also found that some jurors tend to “split the baby” and make 
decisions that reflects compromises.88 This shows one way anchoring can 
work to increase damages. When a plaintiff asks for an irrationally high 
number, that will push the mid-point higher. This tactic does work as well 
for defendants. While a defendant could respond by suggesting an irration-
ally low damages award, it faces a lower bound, zero. In cases where dam-
ages might reasonably be close to zero, the defendant cannot suggest a far 
lower number. 
Still other mock juries considered categories of damages that were not 
found in the instruction. Specifically, they wanted to compensate the plain-
tiffs for the inconvenience associated with receiving a phone without all the 
promised features. 
Juror 24I . . ., although I realize that the camera probably does not cost 
$99 on it’s [sic] own, it is very expensive to get a smartphone, 
and you should get what is advertised when you purchase one. 
If you do not receive what was advertised you have to go 
through the hassle of returning the phone, and then finding a 
new phone and purchasing that phone, or simply living with 
the phone you bought that doesn’t actually have the features 
that you wanted. 
Juror 808 I gave them the amount I did ($40) because I figured that was 
roughly the amount that was fair for the inconvenience of re-
ceiving less storage than they originally believed, but wasn’t 
the most important reason for purchasing this phone. 
In short, while our experiment has shown that a combination of the sali-
ency and anchoring effects likely increase damages assessments for individ-
ual components, our qualitative data suggests there are likely other factors 
that contribute to high valuations. Jurors may be awarding damages for cat-
 88. See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Yuval Rottenstreich & Amos Tversky, Context-
Dependence in Legal Decision Making, 25 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 287, 301 (1996) (describing 
two experiments that show that subjects were more like to choose a verdict when it was a 
compromise between more extreme choices); Sunstein, Kahneman & Schkade, supra note 47, 
at 2132 (“In the context of pain-and-suffering awards, anchors appear to be especially im-
portant . . . Some jurors appear to split the difference between the figures suggested by the 
plaintiff and the defendant . . . .”). 
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egories that are not permitted under the law. These include punitive damag-
es and incidental damages (i.e. for the hassle of getting the wrong phone). 
V. Limitations 
First, we tested the combined effect of saliency and anchoring together. 
In other words, we never isolated either bias individually. We did this con-
sciously in an attempt to make this experiment as realistic as we could. In 
theory, it would have been possible to isolate the saliency effect by elimi-
nating the patentee’s anchor is some experimental conditions. However, that 
never happens in real cases. The patentee always asks the jury for a specific 
damages number. Likewise, it would also be possible for the defendant to 
tell the jury what value the other features (not in suit) were worth. But it 
would have been unrealistic for the defendant to say that features not in suit 
were worth $99. A real defendant would undoubtedly have used a much 
smaller number for each of the other features that contributed value to the 
smartphone. Comparing the value of a particular feature as it moved be-
tween plaintiffs’ case and defendant’s case under these circumstances would 
have been unhelpful. Perhaps, in future experiments, subjects could deter-
mine the value of features outside the context of a trial in a way that would 
allow us to test each bias separately. We leave that possibility for the future. 
But for now, we can only say that saliency and anchoring together increase 
mock jury valuations. 
Second, we asked mock jurors to evaluate the value of different features 
in the context of a product misrepresentation case instead of a patent case. 
While there were legitimate logistical reasons for doing so, there are un-
doubtedly significant differences between these kinds of lawsuits. Indeed, 
the qualitative comments from our experiment showed that many mock ju-
rors did not just focus on the value of the features at interest. Instead, their 
damages calculation considered the defendant’s culpability, which was 
unique to the misrepresentation context. We suspect that similar lines of 
thinking might influence patent juries. While patent juries may be instructed 
to focus on the value of the infringing feature, they may assess damages by 
considering why the defendant failed to avoid infringement. More work 
needs to be done to verify this hypothesis. 
Third, we did not discuss the three extra features (tempered glass, back-
up system, and Wi-Fi/Bluetooth communications) that were part of the To-
gether8 verdict form. Thus, a reason why we may not have seen a signifi-
cant effect between the Together5 and Together8 verdict forms is because 
of a lack of saliency of the three extra features in the mock trial. If the de-
fendant had discussed these three extra features in detail (like the defendant 
did with the other 4 features – camera, storage, security, and voice recogni-
tion), then we may have seen a greater allocation of value to those three fea-
tures, thereby further decreasing the damages award for the feature-at-issue. 
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Fourth, our experiment condensed a trial to roughly ten to fourteen 
minutes of narrated PowerPoint slides. The respondents were not able to see 
the attorneys, experts, or judge and witness their body language during the 
presentation at the trial, which can affect the verdict in many cases. This ab-
breviated format allowed us to utilize a randomized controlled trial experi-
mental design, which is the gold standard for scientific research.89 However, 
there are still reasonable concerns about whether shortening the trial will 
change the way individuals make decisions. 
Fifth, we did not study real jurors. Prior research has shown that “the 
population of Mechanical Turk is at least as representative of the U.S. popu-
lation as traditional subject pools.”90 Known experimental results have been 
replicated using the MTurk population.91 Nonetheless, MTurkers may be 
more easily distracted from the trial compared to real jurors and may even 
provide junk responses (e.g., those who failed to watch the entire video 
without hearing all the arguments and rendered a verdict). It may be that re-
al jurors are more earnest in their efforts to provide meaningful responses or 
that real jurors determine liability differently knowing that the outcomes 
will affect real individuals and companies. 
Lastly, our study involved single mock jurors. Consequently, our mock 
jurors did not deliberate with other jurors as they would do in a real trial. 
Nonetheless, others have shown that individual juror decisions are quite 
predictive of jury decisions. Dennis Devine summarized the literature by 
saying, “[r]esearch has consistently shown a strong and robust relationship 
between the verdict preferred by the majority of jurors at the start of delib-
eration and the jury’s ultimate verdict.”92 With respect to damages, the work 
that has been done suggests that individual juror decisions underestimate 
what juries will decide after deliberation.93 If this held true for valuing indi-
 89. As we mentioned earlier, our experiment was not randomized perfectly because of 
a failure in four conditions of our first attempt. See supra note 71. 
 90. Paolacci, Chandler & Ipeirotis, supra note 70, at 411. 
 91. Berinsky, Huber & Lenz, supra note 70, at 61–65 (2012). 
 92. Dennis J. Devine, JURY DECISION MAKING: THE STATE OF THE SCIENCE, 158 
(2012); see also Maggie Wittlin, The Results of Deliberation, 15 U.N.H. L. REV. 161, 185 
(2017) (summarizing studies that show that individual juror decisions are predictive of jury 
decisions).
 93. See id. at 176 (“deliberating tends to increase jury awards in relation to the mean of 
the jurors’ predeliberation amount preferences”); see also Shari S. Diamond, Michael J. Saks 
& Stephan Landsman, Juror Judgments About Liability and Damages: Sources of Variability 
and Ways to Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 301, 316 (1998) (“jury awards in this 
case were higher than the average mean and median juror awards, a pattern found in several 
other studies of damage awards”); Shari S. Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the 
Jury to Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
513, 553 (1992) (“A clear inflation of damage awards occurred between the individual and the 
group level. On average the juries produced awards about $56,000 (or 26%) higher than the 
average of their members prior to deliberation.”). 
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vidual features in complex products, that would suggest that juries would 
award even higher damages for individual features. 
VI. Implications 
A. Valuing a Multicomponent Feature 
Our results showed that mock jurors value some features more when the 
plaintiffs argued that the feature is valuable than when the defendant made 
the same argument. Because the arguments did not change from plaintiff to 
defendant, the difference in valuations cannot be attributed to the merits of 
any particular argument. Instead, we suggest that a combination of saliency 
and anchoring is distorting mock jurors’ decisions. While we uniformly 
found this affect when we examined how mock jurors ranked the relative 
value of the different features, we did not observe changes in monetary val-
uation in the experimental conditions concerning the storage feature. But it 
is very unlikely that the two positive results were mere flukes. The statisti-
cal analysis showed that there was less than a 1 in 1000 likelihood that the 
finding with respect to the camera feature was due to chance. Moreover, the 
finding with respect to the security feature was even stronger. 
That still leaves an open question. Why did we fail to observe an in-
crease in the valuation of the storage feature when it was the feature-at-issue 
as compared to when it was not the feature-at-issue? Given that the storage 
feature’s ranking decreased, this result is particularly puzzling. We hypothe-
size that mock jurors may have much more experience with the price of 
smartphone storage and are thus less subject to cognitive bias when placing 
a dollar value on that feature. Further research would have to be done to 
prove or disprove this theory. 
These results suggest that the same cognitive biases may be at play in 
multicomponent patent cases. In short, jurors are likely awarding dispropor-
tionately high awards in multicomponent patent cases because of cognitive 
biases. To ameliorate those effects, courts should focus on particular kinds 
of rules directed at these biases. Our jury verdict manipulations attempted to 
test one potential reform, but there are clearly other possibilities.94
B. Jury Verdicts and Framing 
Although our results showed that asking jurors to value many features 
together decreases the value they assess for the feature-in-suit, we were sur-
 94. For example, one defendant unsuccessfully argued that juries should be explicitly 
told about problems with patent hold-up and royalty stacking. See Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link 
Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“D–Link requested that the district court 
instruct the jury regarding the dangers of patent hold-up and royalty stacking in RAND-
related contexts.”). 
Fall 2019] Saliency, Anchors & Frames 35 
prised to see how modest that decrease was: less than 10% of the baseline 
damages award. Still, for cases that involve many millions of dollars, 10% 
is still a large amount. The upshot is that for those that think that patent 
damages in multicomponent cases are too high, giving the jury this novel 
jury verdict form that lists the feature-at-issue alongside other features of 
the multicomponent device is likely to lower damages. Moreover, there are 
reasons to think that a standard verdict form wrongly focuses all the jury’s 
attention on one feature. This creates a saliency bias and leaves the juror 
without meaningful reference points to help frame their analysis. In contrast, 
if a jury were required to value different features simultaneously, two bene-
fits would likely emerge. It would reduce (but not eliminate) any saliency 
bias, and it would also force the jury to create its own reference points (i.e. 
the value of other features) to aid it in calculating the final damage awards. 
But even if courts were sympathetic to these arguments, there remain a 
number of practical questions. How should attorneys and the courts deter-
mine what other features can be fairly added to the jury verdict form? How 
many other features can the jury really value?95
C. Exposing the Anchor 
When defendants specifically told mock jurors that plaintiffs were not 
serious about their high demand ($99 in our experiment) and that the plain-
tiffs were simply trying to take advantage of anchoring, damages verdicts 
were not significantly reduced. Thus, our findings were not consistent with 
Stein & Drouin’s.96 More work will have to be done to see if Stein and 
Drouin’s tactic can be replicated. It may well be that exposing the anchor to 
the decision maker works in some contexts but not others. For now, we still 
have not identified a particularly effective response to a plaintiff that an-
chors the jury in an irrationally high number.97
 95. Expert witnesses are now using a survey technique called conjoint analysis to value 
a specific feature. This involves asking survey respondents to value products with different 
combinations of features and then calculate what the individual features are worth. See J. 
Gregory Sidak & Jeremy O. Skog, Using Conjoint Analysis To Apportion Patent Damages, 25 
FED. CIR. B.J. 581 (2016), for a description of the use of conjoint analysis in calculating pa-
tent damages. However, researchers have pointed out that using this technique on products 
with large numbers of features may have “strained the methodology” by overloading respond-
ents with too much information. See Green & Srinivasan, supra note 50, at 8. Similarly, jurors 
may suffer from cognitive overload when they have to value one feature in a complex multi-
component product. This may place some limit on the number of features that the law can 
meaningfully ask juries to value. 
 96. Of course they tested this particular debiasing strategy in a different context, crimi-
nal sentencing. See Stein & Drouin, supra note 55, at 31. 
 97. See supra notes 56 and 58 and accompanying text (describing the results of a prior 
study assessing how different responses to anchoring works). 
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D. Punitive Damages 
As many of the comments suggest, some mock jurors did not assess 
damages by simply comparing the value of the product as delivered to the 
value of the product as promised. Instead, these mock jurors imposed dam-
ages to either punish the defendant for its previous conduct or deter the de-
fendant (or others) from doing something similar in the future. This was true 
despite clear jury instructions and even though the defendant’s conduct did 
not exhibit the kind of willful disregard of the rights of others that is typical-
ly required to award punitive damages.98
There is a patent analog to this narrative because the same psychologi-
cal effects at play in the experimental product misrepresentation case we 
created are also likely at play in patent cases. In patent cases, juries may not 
be strictly following the Georgia Pacific99 factors for calculating a reasona-
ble royalty or the Panduit100 factors for calculating lost profits.101 Instead it is 
quite possible that they are also punishing defendants for infringing a patent. 
This may be true even when enhanced damages are not uncalled for. In pa-
tent law, 35 U.S.C. § 284 permits courts to award treble damages for “egre-
gious cases of culpable behavior” like intentionally infringing a patent.102
The Supreme Court has called this a “punitive sanction,” presumably to de-
ter others from doing the same.103 Notably, the jury determines whether the 
case qualifies for enhanced damages, but the court must determine whether 
to actually enhance the damages.104 In other words, patent juries do not de-
termine the size of any punitive damages. 
To be clear, we are not suggesting that this experiment proves that ju-
ries in patent cases are awarding punitive damages. It does not. This exper-
iment only shows that some number of mock jurors appear to punish the de-
fendant in this misrepresentation case. However, it does not take a large leap 
in logic to hypothesize that something similar might be occurring when ju-
ries calculate patent damages. Indeed, as discussed earlier, our results are 
 98. See, e.g., Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., 113 P.3d 63, 76 (Cal. 2005) (“At a 
minimum, California law requires conduct done with ‘willful and conscious disregard of the 
rights or safety of others’ or despicable conduct done ‘in conscious disregard’ of a person’s 
rights.”); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) (quoting 
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996) (suggesting punitive damages are 
appropriate when defendant’s conduct is sufficiently “reprehensible”)). 
 99. See Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970), modified sub nom. Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 446 F.2d 
295 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 100. Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978). 
The Panduit factors are typically used in jury instructions on lost profits. See, e.g., Federal 
Circuit Bar Association Model Jury Instruction 6.2 (2016). 
 101. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 102. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932 (2016). 
 103. Id. at 1936. 
 104. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). 
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entirely consistent with other studies that found that juries tend to award 
higher damages when the underlying wrongful conduct is more blamewor-
thy.105 Further work will need to be done to establish if, when, and to what 
extent, the same phenomenon is occurring for patent damages. What per-
centage of jurors punish and how much is that punishment? If the frequency 
is small or the degree of punishment is not large, this may simply be noise 
that is characteristic to any legal system. 
However, if this is significant, several issues arise. It would suggest that 
juries may be usurping the judge’s role under § 284. This would mean that 
patent damages ordinarily couched in terms of compensation are being in-
flated for the purpose of deterring future infringers.106 If the type of in-
fringement does not reflect egregious cases of culpable behavior, that would 
suggest overcompensation. However, even if it does, that may mean patent-
ees are receiving a double recovery, one award of punitive damages from 
the jury and another from the judges. Courts could respond by seeking ways 
to reduce the punitive portion of these awards with better jury instructions 
or by bifurcating the case so that juries are blinded to the defendant’s 
blameworthy conduct.107
But there is another side to this argument. It could be that legal stand-
ards that require higher levels of blameworthy conduct before calling for 
punitive damages are overly protective of defendants.108 They are not con-
sistent with the public’s perception of when punishment is deserved. Per-
haps juries should not follow the letter of law in these cases. Our point is not 
to answer these larger jury nullification questions, but to simply provide 
empirical evidence of how juries will react when they are told to award 
compensatory damages. 
Conclusion
Our study suggests that some combination of saliency bias and anchor-
ing cause juries to award higher damages for two tested features (camera 
resolution and enhanced security), but not a third (amount of storage). For 
the third feature, these heuristics affected how jurors ranked the value of the 
feature, but this effect did not appear to lead to an equivalent change in the 
 105. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 106. Amy L. Landers, Let the Games Begin: Incentives to Innovation in the New Econ-
omy of Intellectual Property Law, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 307, 335-40 (2006) (providing a 
detailed discussion of how different types of damages in patent law either serve to compensate 
patentees or punish or deter infringers). 
 107. See BLINDING AS A SOLUTION TO BIAS: STRENGTHENING BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE,
FORENSIC SCIENCE, AND LAW (Christopher Robertson & Aaron S. Kesselheim eds., 2016) 
(providing many examples of how blinding decision makers to bias can improve decisions in 
various contexts). 
 108. See NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT ch. 11 
(2007) (exploring the topic of jury nullification in depth). 
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monetary valuation. Modifying the jury verdict form to require mock jurors 
to assess the value of many features simultaneously reduced damages mod-
estly while the defendant’s tactic of exposing the anchor did not. In addi-
tion, qualitative comments suggested that some mock jurors resisted the jury 
instructions designed to compensate plaintiffs for the missing feature and 
instead assessed damages to punish the defendant. 
These results are nuanced and cause us to ask as many questions as we 
answer. Why is saliency and anchoring so powerful with two features, but 
less effective in another? What other factors are interacting with our find-
ings to enhance or reduce them in particular contexts? Can our findings be 
replicated with a patent case, particularly with respect to the mock jurors’ 
desire to use damages to punish? We cannot answer these questions now, 
but hope that this article causes both policymakers and commentators to 
start thinking more seriously about how the psychology of jury decision-
making might affect patent damages. It is clearly not enough to lay down a 
set of well thought out rules if juries will not follow them, albeit uninten-
tionally. To the extent that patent damages in multicomponent cases are irra-
tionally large, much work remains to be done to determine why some juries 
disagree, much less nudge their decisions downward. Our study shows that 
revising the jury verdict form only provides limited benefits in this direc-
tion. 
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Appendix A 
Table A1 illustrates the “All Model” where the base case is set at 
“Camera” when the camera is the feature-at-issue. For example, the average 
storage damages value was $7.10 less than the average awarded camera 
damages value. 
Table A1 – All Model 
Variable Basic  
Model 
Basic + 
Verdict 
Basic + 
Debias 
Basic + 
Political 
(“Strong 
Dems”) 
All Model 
Feature-At-
Issue (Intercept 
set at Camera 
Value) 
65.89*** 69.34*** 66.90*** 73.02*** 63.70*** 
Storage Feature -$7.10*
Security
Feature 
-$22.50***
Verdict (rank 5)  -5.04 -4.78 
Verdict (rank 8)  -5.44 -4.72 
Debias (ON)  -2.09 -1.56 
Gender (male)  +0.06 
Age  +0.16 
Education  
(leveled at 
“some high 
school  
education”) 
 -0.79 
Income (leveled 
at “less than 
$10,000”) 
 +4.21 
Politics (Slight 
Republican) 
 -16.06*** -10.73* 
Politics  
(Repubs) 
 -15.47*** -9.96* 
Politics (Strong
Repubs) 
 -12.85* -5.79 
Basic + Framing (isolate Framing effect)
Table A2 shows how different jury verdicts affected damages. The base 
case is the standard jury verdict form, where each respondent valued the 
feature-at-issue separately, rather than simultaneously with either 5 or 8 
other features. Table A2 also contains 95% confidence intervals. 
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Table A2 – Basic + Framing 
 Average 
Damages 
Award 
Std. Error t value p-value Confidence 
Intervals 
Normal (Inter-
cept)
$69.34 2.87 24.20 1.50e-101 $63.72 to 
$74.96 
Together5 -$5.04 from 
intercept 
3.05 -1.65 0.09 -$11.03 to 
$0.96  
Together8 -$5.44 from 
intercept 
3.15 -1.73 0.08 -$11.63 to 
$0.74  
Together5+8 -$5.23 2.65 -1.97 0.049*  -$10.44 to  
-$0.02 
Basic + Debiasing (isolate Debiasing effect)
Table A3 shows the effect on damage values when the defendant accused 
the plaintiffs of anchoring. The base case is the “no counter” argument, 
where the plaintiff does not expose the defendant’s psychological “anchor-
ing” techniques during the trial. Table A3 also contains 95% confidence in-
tervals. 
Table A3 – Basic + Exposing the Anchor 
 Average 
Damages 
Award 
Std. Error t value P-value Confidence 
Intervals 
No Counter 
(Intercept) 
$66.90 2.59 25.87 1.38e-112 $61.82 to 
$71.98  
Counter ON -$2.09 from 
intercept 
2.56 - 0.82 0.41 -$7.10 to 
$2.93  
Political Regression
Table A4 illustrates how damages values are affected based on political 
leanings. The base case is set to the average damages value for respondents 
who strongly preferred Democrats and where the feature at issue was the 
security feature. 
Table A4 – Politics 
 Average Damages
Award 
Std. Error t value p-value 
(Intercept) $50.75 3.03 16.77 < .001 *** 
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FAIcam $22.27 3.07 7.27 < .001 *** 
FAIsto $15.31 3.11 4.93 < .001 *** 
Dems -$8.86 4.11 2.15 .031* 
Slight Dems -$4.47 4.46 -1.00 .32 
No Preference -$6.78 3.98 -1.74 .083 
Slight Repubs -$16.07 4.80 -3.35 < .001 *** 
Repubs -$15.47 4.62 -3.35 < .001 *** 
Strong Repubs -$12.85 5.28 -2.43 .015* 

